

Annual Directors' Remuneration Report



2024/2025

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Dear Shareholders:

On behalf of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee of Logista Integral, S.A., I am pleased to present to you the Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration 2024/2025, which will be presented to a vote at the 2026 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on an advisory basis.

Specifically, this Report explains how the Directors' Remuneration Policy has been applied in the 2024-2025 financial year that we have just closed and advances the general lines of application in the new 2025-2026 financial year. In this regard, I would like to remind you that the Shareholders' Meeting held on 5 February 2025 approved, with broad support (99.21%), a new Directors' Remuneration Policy 2025-2027. Specifically, it is the remuneration policy that received the most support among the companies listed on the Ibex-35.

In line with the commitment made last year, this year we maintain our approach based on national and international best practice in the preparation of the Annual Directors' Remuneration Report. Although the format follows the model of the previous exerciser - respecting the content required by the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV)-, improvements have been made to the presentation of the information in response to feedback received from shareholders and proxy advisors, thereby enhancing the clarity and transparency of the report.

Results of the 2025 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders in relation to the proposals on Directors' remuneration

Due to the resignation of the Director Secretary, who was replaced by an independent Director position, a redrafting of the remuneration policy previously approved in 2024 was proposed to the Shareholders' Meeting on 5 February to accommodate the new composition of the Board of Directors, and to further improve the clarity and transparency of our remuneration framework.

The new Policy therefore incorporated the elimination of the remuneration terms of the Secretary Director and included the updating of the amounts of the remuneration of the directors in their capacity as such, in the terms already advanced in the Annual Remuneration Report presented at the same Meeting, which obtained a broad support (98.90%).

In relation to the Chief Executive Officer, apart from the annual update of the amount of Fixed Remuneration, no other changes were made to the Policy.

In consideration of the high percentage of votes in favour, which broadly supports the increased transparency exercise carried out in recent years, and after analysing the vote of the institutional shareholders and the comments received from the proxy advisors, the Company remains firmly committed to applying best market practices to the remuneration of its Directors for the 2025-2026 financial year.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, an amendment to the current Remuneration Policy will be proposed at the next General Shareholders' Meeting so that the maximum amount of Short-Term Variable Remuneration reaches 118.75% of the target amount (currently the maximum limit is 115%).

Main changes in Directors' remuneration for the financial year 2024-2025

As mentioned above, directors' remuneration remains in line with previous years and the most noteworthy developments in relation to directors' remuneration are as follows:

Chief Executive Officer:

- Fixed Remuneration: Its amount is updated for the year 2026 (1 January to 31 December) by 3% for the CEO.
- Short-Term Variable Remuneration: increase in the maximum amount to 118.75% of the target amount (subject to the General Shareholders' Meeting approving the amendment to the Policy). This percentage is the result of increasing the maximum limit of adjusted EBIT and working capital from 120% to 125% for a scenario of over-compliance with these two financial objectives, which have a weighting of 75%. On the other hand, the maximum limit of 100% is maintained for individual and sustainability objectives, which have a weighting of 25%.
- Long-Term Variable Remuneration: the Board of Directors has approved the objectives of the Second Consolidation Period of the Long-Term Incentive Plan 2024-2026, launched in October 2025 and vesting in September 2028. In this regard:
 - (65%) Adjusted EBIT.
 - (25%) Comparative Performance vs. 12 companies and indices included in the Comparison Group.
 - (10%) Sustainability objectives linked to the kilometres travelled by the fleet with low-emission vehicles.

Directors in their capacity as such:

Both the fixed allowances and the attendance allowances remain unchanged.

Logista's performance in the financial year 2024-2025 and implications for remuneration

Our Remuneration Policy establishes a direct link between the remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer and the achievement of strategic objectives and Logista's Business Plan. This is reflected in a balanced remuneration mix that implies a significant weighting of performance-linked remuneration and long-term remuneration.

In the financial year 2024-2025 Logista has achieved an Adjusted Operating Profit, including inventory revaluation, in line with market expectations. However, as a result of lower results in the transport business, the Adjusted Operating Profit, excluding the effect of the inventory revaluation (hereinafter "Adjusted EBIT"), is somewhat lower than in the financial year 2023-2024.

The objectives set in the Short-Term Variable Remuneration for the financial year 2024-2025 were Adjusted EBIT (60%), Working Capital (15%), Personal Contribution (15%) and Sustainability (10%).

Although the objectives relating to Working Capital, Personal Contribution and Sustainability were met, the final payout percentage was 39,3%, as the demanding minimum threshold required for adjusted EBIT was not reached, which prevented the activation of the tranche corresponding to this indicator. In relation to the personal contribution, the Board of Directors, at the proposal of the NRC, has positively assessed the development of the Chief Executive Officer in the areas considered key, as detailed in section 3.2.2 below.

In addition, in September 2025, the second cycle of the Long-Term Incentive Plan 2021-2023 ended, with a payout percentage of 63,6%. This percentage reflects partial compliance with the Adjusted EBIT (65%) and Comparative Profitability (25%) metrics. Sustainability targets - Low Emission Fleet Kilometres travelled (5%) and CDP List Maintenance (5%) - were met at the expected level.

The above payout percentages have resulted in a significantly lower total remuneration for the Chief Executive Officer compared to the previous year. This is an indication that the Directors' Remuneration Policy has worked as intended, aligned with the principle of "pay for performance", and maintaining a level of demand on variable remuneration in line with the expectations of our shareholders.

In any case, maintaining the dividend policy remains a priority for Logista and €2.09/share will be distributed against the 2024-2025 financial year (same figure as last year).

Looking to the future

The Appointment and Remuneration Committee will continue to review during the 2025-2026 financial year the economic and business context and consider any changes that may be appropriate to the Directors' Remuneration Policy in future years. We will consult with our major shareholders and proxy advisers (and seek their approval where necessary) to the extent that changes are proposed. However, no significant changes are expected in the medium to long term.

Finally, I would like to thank you on behalf of the Appointment and Remuneration Committee and, at the direction of the Chairman, the entire Board of Directors, for taking the time for your reading the Annual Directors' Remuneration Report, in the hope that it will be simple and clear. I would also like to welcome any comments, recommendations and suggestions we may receive from you.


Yours sincerely,

*Ms. Teresa Paz-Ares, Chairwoman of
the Appointments and Remuneration
Committee*

1. Summary of remuneration

1.1. Total Target Remuneration for the Chief Executive Officer in the financial year 2025-2026

The Total Target Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer, i.e. that which will accrue in the event of 100% achievement of the objectives, is determined by the following structure:




Notes to the chart:

- Fixed Remuneration: In the case of the Chief Executive Officer, the Fixed Remuneration has been increased by 3% compared to the financial year 2024/2025.
- Target Short-Term Variable Remuneration: As in 2024/2025, this represents 150% of Fixed Remuneration.
- Long-Term Variable Remuneration Target: Corresponds to the expected value of the last cycle launched.
- Pensions - Annual Contribution: Includes contributions to the Group's Employment Pension Plan and the Executives' Welfare Plan.
- Board Remuneration: Includes Fixed Remuneration for Board membership and Per diem allowances. In the calculation, 8 Board meetings have been estimated.
- Remuneration in Kind has not been considered in the graph.

1.2. Remuneration mix of Chief Executive Officer in the financial year 2025- 2026

As explained in previous sections, the Company, in its compensation strategy, is committed to a remuneration mix in which the variable components outweigh the fixed components, thus materialising the *pay for performance* principle.

The remuneration mix (Fixed Remuneration, Short-Term Variable Target Remuneration and Long-Term Variable Target Remuneration), which determines the leverage of Chief Executive Officers' remuneration in the Variable Remuneration, is as follows for the financial year 2025-2026:




Notes to the chart:

- Contributions to Pension Plans, Board Remuneration and Remuneration in Kind have been excluded for the purpose of this chart.

As can be seen in the graph, in the financial year 2025-2026, the Target Variable Remuneration has a weight of 79% in the remuneration package of the Chief Executive Officer (Fixed Remuneration + Variable Remuneration)

1.3. Total Remuneration Accrued by Chief Executive Officer in the financial year 2024-2025

The following graph shows the amount of each remuneration element and its weight in the Total Remuneration Accrued in the financial year 2024-2025. The upper part of the graph shows the Total Remuneration Accrued in thousands of euros:



Notes to the chart:

- Fixed Remuneration: the Fixed Remuneration has been increased by 2% with respect to the financial year 2023/2024
- Target Short-Term Variable Remuneration: The percentage of achievement of the Annual Variable Remuneration in the financial year 2023/2024 has been 39.3% for the incentive of the Chief Executive Officer.
- Vested Long-Term Variable Remuneration: Corresponds to the second cycle of the Long-Term Incentive Plan 2021-2023, which was launched in October 2022 and vested in September 2025. The percentage of achievement in the incentive was 63.6%.
- Pensions: Annual Contribution: Includes contributions to both the Group's Employment Pension Plan and the Executives' Pension Plan during the 2023/2024 financial year.
- Board Remuneration: Includes Fixed Remuneration for Board membership and per diems for Board attendance, having met 10 times in the financial year 2024-2025.

As can be seen in the graph, Variable Remuneration has a weighting of 63% in the remuneration package of the Chief Executive Officer (Total Remuneration Accrued)

This section does not include the data of the former Secretary-Director due to the short period of time corresponding to this fiscal year, although the full details of her remuneration are attached in section three of this report, as well as in the Statistical Annex.

1.4. Remuneration of the Directors in their capacity as Directors

The remuneration of the Directors in their capacity as such comprises of a fixed monthly allowance and Per diem allowances for attendance at the corresponding meetings. The maximum limit for such remuneration established in the Remuneration Policy is 1,600,000 euros.

To date, the proprietary Directors waived receiving any remuneration as Directors of the Company. Likewise, following the recommendations of the CNMV's Code of Good Governance

("CGG"), the Directors in their capacity as such do not have variable remuneration systems or instruments linked to the share value, life insurance, long-term savings systems or other social welfare systems.

In relation to the amounts of these concepts for the financial year 2025-2026, this will remain unchanged:.

Fixed monthly cash allowance:	
President of the Board	€ 30,600
Director	€ 5,400
Chairman of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee	€1,700
Chairman of the Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee	€1,800

Per diem allowances for attendance at meetings (per meeting):	
Board of Directors	€2,917
Appointments and Remuneration Committee	€1,061
Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee	€1,714

In relation to the financial year 2024-2025, the Fixed Remuneration amounted to 858 thousand euros and the remuneration accrued as Per diem allowances amounted to 258 thousand euros.

2. Directors' Remuneration Policy for the Financial Year 2025-2026

2.1. Applicable remuneration policy

The Policy applicable for the current financial year is the Remuneration Policy 2025-2027, approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders of the Company at its meeting held on 6 February 2025.

This Policy eliminates the remuneration terms of the Secretary Director and included the updating of the amounts of the remuneration of the directors in their capacity as such, in the terms already advanced in the Annual Remuneration Report of the previous year.

2.2. General principles of the Policy

The Remuneration Policy is designed to attract, retain and motivate the best professionals and to establish a stable and long-lasting link between remuneration, performance and shareholders' interests, thereby achieving the Group's long-term objectives. In addition, the Company ensures that the Policy is in line with the principles and recommendations of the CGG, best market practices and the guidelines of shareholders and investors.

In this regard, the general principles and foundations on which the Remuneration Policy is based are followings:

		Executive Directors	Non-Executive Directors
Link with the business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability	Contribute to the business strategy, and to the long-term interests and sustainability of the Company, in particular by creating shareholder value in a sustainable manner over time	✓	
Pay for performance	Establishing a direct link with the achievement of strategic objectives (financial and non-financial) that are specific, quantifiable and aligned with the Business Plan, focusing on the creation of sustainable value. Establishing a balanced remuneration mix, with a significant weighting of performance-linked remuneration, particularly in the long term.	✓	
Risk control	Variable remuneration is not guaranteed, so that it is possible not to pay this component if certain targets are not met, and it is subject to certain adjustment mechanisms (malus and clawback clauses) that allow it to be sufficiently flexible. The weighting of fixed and variable elements in the remuneration mix allows for adequate risk management.	✓	
Competitiveness	By establishing a remuneration framework that is in line with best market practice and competitive with other comparable companies, enabling it to attract and retain the best professionals.	✓	✓
Fairness and adequacy	Reward in an appropriate manner, taking into account the professional background, experience, qualifications, dedication and level of responsibility, without this constituting an obstacle to their duty of loyalty and the independence of judgement of the Directors in their capacity as such.	✓	✓
Non-discrimination (Equal Pay)	Policies and practices ensure that no criteria are applied that discriminate on the basis of sex, age, culture, religion or race.	✓	✓
Transparency	The Company is committed to transparency and communication with all its stakeholders, including shareholders, employees and analysts, so that the Policy can be easily understood by all <i>stakeholders</i> .	✓	✓

2.3. Remuneration elements for Chief Executive Officer in the financial year 2025-2026

As far as remuneration for executive functions is concerned, it includes:

- A Fixed Remuneration;
- A Short-term Variable Remuneration (Annual);
- A Long-Term Variable Remuneration, granted in shares of the Company (Pluriannual);
- In addition, Chief Executive Officer benefits from a complementary social welfare system, linked to retirement and other contingencies, and other remuneration in kind, in line with that received by the Company's management team.

In addition, the Chief Executive Officer receive the corresponding remuneration for their membership of the Board of Directors, as do the other directors in their capacity as such.

In order to determine the target levels of the remuneration package, the Company carried out an analysis of the external competitiveness of the CEO's remuneration. For this analysis, Logista has been advised by WTW.

The remuneration benchmarking has been carried out on the basis of a comparison group made up of Spanish listed companies and in line with the comparison group of the previous benchmarking carried out in financial year 2023. In this regard, Spanish listed companies have been selected, with turnover and capitalisation levels within a preset range, excluding banks, subsidiaries or companies whose parent companies are outside Spain. These companies are as follows:

Acciona	Acerinox	CIE Automotive	Ebro Foods
Elecnor	Gestamp	Grifols	Indra
Mapfre	Puig	Sacyr	Técnicas Reunidas

While in terms of Total Target Remuneration, the CEO's remuneration package is in line with the relative size of the Company compared to its peer group entities, Logista's remuneration mix is much more leveraged on variable remuneration compared to market levels.

2.3.1. Fixed Remuneration

The Chief Executive Officer, for the performance of his management duties in the Company, receive a Fixed Remuneration, paid in cash. This remuneration is established at the following amounts for the year 2026 (calendar year, from 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2026)

	Fixed salary 2025	% increase	Fixed salary 2026
Chief Executive Officer	€ 900,562	3%	€92,579

These amounts were fixed at the meeting of the Board of Directors on 5 November 2025 on the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee.

The determination of these salary increase has taken into account the market information on salary increases forecasts provided by the main consulting firms in the field: WTW and Mercer and al as well as the company's non-statutory increase.

2.3.2. Short-Term Variable Remuneration (Annual)

Short-Term Variable Remuneration is aimed to be in line with most common market practices in remuneration and to link its payment to the fulfilment of annual objectives in line with the Business Plan. The Board of Directors, at the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, establishes for each financial year the different objectives to be met, as well as the objective quantification of each of them.

The amounts to be awarded to Executive Director under Short-Term Variable Remuneration are as follows:

	Chief Executive Officer % of Fixed Remuneration
Target amounts (in case of 100% compliance with the objectives)	150% (€ 1,391,368)
Maximum amounts (118,75%* of the target amount in case of maximum achievement of the objectives)	178,1% (€1,652,250)
Subject to the General Shareholders' Meeting approving the amendment to the Remuneration Policy. If not approved, the maximum amount would be 115% of the target amount (172.5% of the Fixed Remuneration).	

For the financial year 2025-2026 the targets and weightings are the same as in the previous year:

75% Business Objectives:
- 60% Adjusted EBIT - 15% Working Capital
25% Individual Targets:
- 15% Personal Contribution - 10% Sustainability

Executive Director has set upper limits for an overachievement scenario that motivate and reinforce the achievement of the Company's results, in order to incentivise the achievement of extraordinary results. Thus, the two financial targets Adjusted EBIT and Working Capital can be over-achieved by up to 125%, (subject to the approval of General Shareholder's meeting). The calculation of these targets does not take into account inventory changes and new acquisitions.

On the other hand, with respect to personal objectives, it is important to note that the Board determines the percentage of achievement based on the quality of the results and the individual performance, but also includes among the metrics for evaluating this contribution the achievement of certain sustainability parameters, linked to the reduction of workplace accidents, the development of internal talent, diversity and gender equality, as well as the environmental impact, encouraging the greater use of low-emission vehicles in the Company's fleet.

These objectives, which were deployed throughout the organisation in the remuneration schemes of the management team, contribute directly to ensuring that the evolution and growth of the company in the financial year is aligned with long-term growth and that this is built on a basis of responsibility and contribution of value to society. Consequently, these metrics, which are composed by qualitative objectives and sustainability objectives, will be the following in the 2025/2026 financial year:

Chief Executive Officer	
Qualitative personal objectives Weight: 15%	Integrations: New business's integrations, with special focus on synergies, reporting, operations and culture. Strategic Planning: Focus on organic and inorganic growth. External Stakeholder Relations: Keep developing and strengthening relations/network with relevant stakeholders. Organizational Optimization and Performance base culture: Ongoing optimization of the current structure and key roles . Continuous transformation from traditional leadership to transformational / inspirational leadership.
Sustainability Objectives Weight: 10%	- Reduction of accidents. Reduction of the "Lost time accidents" indicator - Talent Density" indicator in LVC positions (Top 600) - Pay gap reduction - Hiring women in leadership and management positions. - Improving the employee engagement index. - Environment, emissions reduction by increasing the number of low-emission kilometres

2.3.3. Long-Term Variable Remuneration (Multi-year)

The purpose of the Long-Term Variable Remuneration, in line with best remuneration practices, is to establish a multi-year remuneration framework that links the remuneration of executive directors to the long-term interests and value creation of shareholders and allows for a sustainable achievement of the strategic objectives included in the Business Plan.

The functioning of the Long-Term Incentive Plans in force is based on the initial recognition of a number of potentially consolidable shares, which are settled after a period of 3 years has elapsed, depending on the degree of compliance with defined objectives. The number of shares is determined by dividing the target incentive amount by the weighted average market price of the Company's shares at the close of trading in the thirty trading sessions prior to the recognition date of the relevant cycle. In this respect, the target incentive amounts to 225% of the Fixed Remuneration in the case of the Chief Executive .

The number of target actions is calculated if 100% of the objectives are met. The maximum number of actions (116.25% of the target) will be paid in case of maximum achievement of the objectives.

The cycles of these Plans are launched annually in an overlapping manner. Accordingly, the second cycle of the 2024-2026 Long-Term Incentive Plan, approved by the General Shareholders' Meeting of 2 February 2024, commenced during the current financial year. In addition, the third cycle of the Long-Term Incentive Plan 2021-2023 and the first cycle of the 204-2026 Long Term Incentive Plan remain in force during this financial year:

Long Term Incentive Plan 2024-2026:			
Cycle	Date of recognition	Measure ment period	Objectives and weighting
2 ^{er} Cycle	5/11/2025	01/10/25 - 31/09/28	- 65% Adjusted EBIT - 25% Profitability Comparison with other companies - 10% Sustainability: Kms travelled by the fleet with low emission vehicles
1 ^{er} Cycle	5/11/2024	01/10/24 - 31/09/27	
No. of shares:			
	Target	Maximum	
2 nd Cycle	70,209	81,618	
1 ^{er} Cycle	72,448	84,221	

Long Term Incentive Plan 2021-2023:			
Cycle	Date of recognition	Measurement period	Objectives and weighting
3 ^{er} Cycle	7/11/2023	01/10/23 - 31/09/26	- 65% Adjusted EBIT - 25% Profitability Comparison with other companies - 10% Sustainability: • 5% CDP-List • 5% Km travelled by the fleet with low-emission vehicles
Number of shares:			
3 ^{er} Cycle	Target	Maximum	
3 ^{er} Cycle	82.436	95.832	

Additional information on the objectives:

Adjusted EBIT:

In calculating this target, no allowance is made for inventory profit or loss, as well as for new acquisitions that may occur during the measurement period.

The determination of the degree of compliance with the adjusted EBIT is made by the Board of Directors after the Company's annual accounts have been audited, which allows any qualifications that may be made to reduce the amount of variable remuneration to be taken into account.

The scale of achievement is determined as follows:

Adjusted EBIT compliance level	Percentage of achievement	Percentage of target payment
Below the minimum level	<90%	0%
Minimum level	90%	50%
Target level	100%	100%
Maximum level	>=125 %	125%
<i>If the Company's adjusted EBIT falls between the minimum level and the target, the payout ratio will increase by 2.5% for every 0,5% increase in the degree of achievement (i.e. for an achievement ratio of 90.50% the payout ratio is 52.5%). Between the target and the maximum level, the payout percentage will be calculated by linear interpolation.</i>		

As can be seen, this objective has a minimum threshold below which the payout percentage is zero and can also have an overachievement payout of up to 125%. The payout percentages are then multiplied by the weighting this objective has in the corresponding cycle of the Long-Term Incentive Plan (in the current cycles this weighting is 65%).

At the end of the target measurement periods, the Company will detail in the Annual Report on Remuneration the Adjusted EBIT target achievement levels, the level of achievement of the target and the corresponding payout percentage.

Corporate profitability:

This objective compares Logista's Total Shareholder Return ("TSR") against the TSR achieved by certain entities and indices securitised by the Company.

The Board of Directors, at the proposal of the ARC, has updated the Benchmarking Group for the 1st and 2nd Cycles of the Long-Term Incentive Plan 2024-2026. The companies included have been selected in the context of Logista's activities, i.e. among its main customers and among competitors with similar characteristics. Certain relevant stock market indices are also taken into account given the Company's characteristics:

BAT Plc.	Imperial Brands Plc.	Philip Morris International	IBEX medium cap
Deutsche Post AG.(DHL)	JTI Inc.	Inc. Stef, S.A.	IBEX top dividend
ID Logistics	XPO Logistics	Marr	NTG

The Comparison Group for the 3rd Cycle of the Long-Term Incentive Plan 2021-2023 is as follows:

BAT Plc.	Imperial Brands Plc.	Philip Morris International	IBEX medium cap
Deutsche Post AG.(DHL)	JTI Inc.	Inc. Stef, S.A.	IBEX top dividend
ID Logistics	McKesson Corp.	XPO Logistics	

On the other hand, the scale of achievement of the Comparative Profitability objective, which is common to all current cycles, is as follows:

Performance Comparison Logista vs. Comparator Group	Percentage of target payment
Below the median of the reference group	0%
From the median of the reference group	40%
From the third quartile of the reference group onwards	90%
From the 90th percentile of the reference group	100%
<i>If the Company's TSR falls between the median and the third quartile, or between the third quartile and ninety percentiles, the result will be calculated by linear interpolation.</i>	

If the Company's performance, calculated in terms of TSR, is below the median of the comparables described in the previous paragraph, no payment will be made for this target, the target to achieve 100% being at the 90th percentile of that comparator group and taking into account that there is no payment above the target in case of overachievement of that target.

The payment percentages are then multiplied by the weighting of this objective in the corresponding cycle of the Long-Term Incentive Plan (in the current cycles this weighting is 25%).

Sustainability:

In relation to sustainability, in each cycle the Board of Directors, at the proposal of the ARC, selects the metrics that best reflect the Company's priorities in this area.

In this respect, the 1st Cycle (2024-2027) of the 2024-2026 Long-Term Incentive Plan includes a single objective related to emissions reduction through an increase in the percentage of kilometres driven by the Logista fleet with low-emission vehicles.

The 2nd and 3rd Cycle of the Long-Term Incentive Plan 2021-2023 include two targets, each with the same weight (5%):

- Percentage of kilometres driven by the Logista fleet with low-emission vehicles.
- Logista's *Carbon Disclosure Project* ("CDP") score.

The scales of achievement of the above-mentioned objectives are as follows:

Compliance level - % km low emissions	Percentage of achievement	Percentage of target payment
Below the minimum level	<63%	0%
Minimum level	63%	63%
Target level	100%	100%
Above the target level	>100%	100%
<i>If the km travelled falls between the minimum and target level, the payment percentage will be calculated by linear interpolation. The percentage of the minimum level varies in each plan according to the percentage points to be improved, being 69% for Plan 24 first Cycle and 60% for the second Cycle, 63% for Plans 21, 3rd Consolidation Period..</i>		

Level of compliance - CDP score	Percentage of achievement	Percentage of target payment
Below the minimum level	A-B-B	0%
Minimum level	A-A-B	75%
Target level	A-A-A	100%
Above the target level	A-B-B	0%
<i>This target has only three possible charging options depending on the score obtained over the three-year duration of the scheme. The order of the scores is irrelevant</i>		

The payment percentages are then multiplied by the weighting of each objective in the corresponding cycle of the Long-Term Incentive Plan.

The extent to which objectives have been met is not determined until the duly audited annual accounts are available.

Shareholding obligation:

Likewise, in order to reduce exposure to risk, Executive Director is obliged to maintain a package of shares of those delivered in application of the long-term incentives equivalent to 2 years of annual Fixed Remuneration for the entire duration of his contractual relationship.

2.3.4. Long-term savings schemes

Chief Executive Officer participates in the Group's Employment Pension Plan (generally applicable to Group employees). This Plan is a defined contribution plan and the monthly contributions made by the Company correspond to 6.9% of the regulatory salary (Base Salary of the Logista Collective Bargaining Agreement for Level III of the "Management" professional group).

The Executive Director also participates in the Directors' Welfare Plan, to which the Group makes contributions calculated based on a maximum of 20% of salary and Short-Term Variable Remuneration, as set out in the Policy.

Specifically, during the financial year 2025-2026, the following contributions are expected to be made to the various long-term savings schemes of the Executive Director amounts to 433 thousand euros in a target remuneration scenario.

It should be noted that, as a consequence of the application of the *pay for performance* principle, contributions to the Directors' Welfare Plan may be substantially reduced if the Short-Term Variable Remuneration target is not reached.

The contingencies covered are retirement, permanent disability and death, in addition to general illness, in the case of the Social Welfare Plan for Executives.

The vested economic rights derived from both Plans are compatible with the compensation for termination or early termination or derived from the contractual relationship, as these plans are not compensation plans, but rather additional benefits that form part of the annual remuneration to which Executive Director is contractually entitled.

2.3.5. Remuneration in kind

Executive Directors are entitled to a remuneration package in kind similar to that of the Company's management team. This remuneration consists among other things:

- Company vehicle and fuel supply
- Family health insurance
- Life and accident insurance
- Meal Vouchers

In the financial year 2025/2026 the cost of this remuneration amounted to EUR 32.642 for the Chief Executive Officer. The cost in the financial year 2025/2026 is expected to be similar but will depend on the development of insurance premiums and the leasing quotas.

On the other hand, the Company has taken out and pays the global premium corresponding to a Directors' and executives' civil liability insurance policy covering all

Directors, both executive and non-executive. In this policy, the Directors are considered insured for the liabilities that may be demanded of them because of the performance of the activities inherent to their functions. Both the Chief Executive Officer's and the Secretary's contracts require the Company to take out a civil liability insurance policy.

2.3.6. Possible payments in case of termination

Severance pay:

The Chief Executive Officer may be entitled to receive compensation equivalent to the fixed and variable short-term remuneration that, at the time of termination, they received as executive director in the following cases: (i) unjustified unilateral termination of the contract by the Logista Group, (ii) serious breach of the obligations undertaken by the Logista Group in the relevant service contract; (iii) in the case of the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Executive Officer ceases to be the sole Chief Executive Officer.

Non-competition agreement:

The Chief Executive Officer's contract includes a 12-month post-contractual non-competition covenant. This covenant is remunerated, the compensation for the non-competition restriction being an annuity of fixed and variable remuneration in the short term.

In this respect, it should be noted that the payments to be received by the CEO in the event of termination of the contract (one year's fixed and variable remuneration in the short term in all cases of termination plus one year's fixed and variable annual remuneration for non-competition agreements) are below the limit established in the CBG.

2.4. Contractual conditions of executive directors

2.4.1. Malus and clawback

The contracts of the Executive Director have "malus" clauses that allow the Company to cancel the payment of long-term variable remuneration, as well as "clawback" clauses to demand the return of both short and long-term remuneration already paid, in certain cases during the 2 years following their settlement and payment. These events are defined in the Remuneration Policy 2025-2027 and are as follows:

- The fact that the settlement and payment of such remuneration has been made wholly or partially based on information which is manifestly false or seriously inaccurate, and which is subsequently proven to be so;
- Material restatement with a material adverse impact on the financial statements when considered by the external auditors (except for changes in accounting standards);
- Sanction of the Executive Director for serious breach of the Law or the Code of Conduct and other applicable internal regulations, if the breach has seriously damaged Logista's image and reputation or the perception of Logista by markets, customers, suppliers or regulators, among others.

The Board of Directors, at the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, shall determine, as the case may be, whether the circumstances have arisen that should lead to the application of the aforementioned clauses and that the variable remuneration, if any, should be cancelled or returned to the Company or Group companies.

2.4.2. Notice clauses

In addition to what is explained in the previous section, the content of the contractual clauses was reviewed by the Board of Directors in the financial year 2019-2020 to bring them into line with best market practices on the entry of the new Executive Directors.

The duration of the contracts of the Executive Directors is indefinite and does not include any clauses of permanence.

The notice clauses are as follows:

- By voluntary unilateral decision of the Chief Executive Officer: at least 12 months' notice, with the obligation to pay the Company, in the event of non-compliance with this period, an indemnity equivalent to one year's fixed and short-term variable remuneration corresponding to the period of notice not given.
- By unilateral decision without just cause by the Company: at least 12 months' notice, with an obligation to pay the Chief Executive Officer in the event of non-compliance with this period an indemnity equivalent to one year's fixed and short-term variable remuneration corresponding to the period of notice not given.

The contract of Executive Director include *Garden leave* clauses, by virtue of which, in the event of notification by the Director to the Company of the desire to terminate the contractual relationship by unilateral decision of the executive Director, the Company may agree to terminate the Director's duties and require him to cease rendering services, in which case he will remain on paid leave until termination.

2.5. Directors' remuneration in their capacity as Directors in the financial year 2025-2026

The remuneration of the Directors in their capacity as such consists of a fixed annual allowance and per diems for attendance at the relevant meetings.

The amounts for these items remain unchanged, as determined by the Council at its meeting on 5 November 2025.. The amounts of these items were determined at the Board of Directors' meeting held on 5 November 2024, at the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, which agreed to review them considering the data on Directors' remuneration reported in the CNMV report for 2023, and the growth of the company, after four years of maintaining them unchanged.

According to the report, the new directors' remuneration remains below the 10th percentile compared to independent directors of Ibex companies and at the 50th percentile in the case of non-Ibex companies.

As detailed in the initial summary, these amounts are as follows:

Fixed monthly cash allowance:	
President of the Board	€ 30,600
Director	€ 5,400
Chairman of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee	€1,700
Chairman of the Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee	€1,800

Per diem allowances for attendance at meetings (per meeting):	
Board of Directors	€2,917
Appointments and Remuneration Committee	€1,061
Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee	€1,714

In accordance with the recommendations of the CNMV's Code of Good Governance, the Directors in their capacity as such do not have (i) variable remuneration systems either in cash, shares or rights over shares, or instruments referenced to the value of the share (ii) life insurance, or (iii) long-term savings systems or other social welfare systems.

The proprietary directors waive the right to receive any remuneration as directors of the Company.

In the case of the Chairman of the Board and the Chairmen of the Committees, in addition to the remuneration corresponding to their status as Directors, there is the remuneration established for the exercise of these chairmanship functions.

The fixed remuneration for the current financial year will therefore amount to € 862,800 as long as there are no changes in the composition of the Board. The remuneration to be accrued as per diems will depend on the number of meetings of the various Board bodies that are eventually held.

As in previous years, when determining the amount of this remuneration, the Board has taken into consideration (1) that it is in line with market standards, for which purpose the information contained in the CNMV Report on remuneration of Directors of listed companies of 2023 has been considered, and (2) that it is established in accordance with the positions held by the Director on the Board and its Committees.

3. Implementation of the Remuneration Policy in the financial year 2023-2024

3.1. Applicable remuneration policy

From 1 October 2024 to 4 February 2025, the Directors' Remuneration Policy 2024-2026, approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders on 2 February 2024, was applied. From 5 February 2025, the Directors' Remuneration Policy 2025-2027 (the "Policy"), approved by the Company's General Meeting of Shareholders at its meeting held on 5 February 2025, came into effect.

The 2024-2026 Policy was very similar to the 2025-2027 Remuneration Policy, already described in section 2 above. except that the remuneration system of the former Secretary Director was included. In this respect, the remuneration accrued in the 2025-2026 financial year for executive directors and directors in their capacity as such consisted of the same elements as those described in the previous section.

On the other hand, there have been no deviations from the procedure for applying the policies in force during the year, nor have any temporary exceptions been applied.

3.2. Remuneration elements for Executive Directors in the financial year 2024-2025

The remuneration elements accruing to Executive Directors in 2024-2025 are the same as those described in the previous section:

- Fixed Remuneration.
- Variable Remuneration (Short-term and Long-term).
- Social welfare systems.
- Remuneration in kind.

In the case of the Director Secretary, this section 3 describes the remuneration accrued up to the date on which she left the Company (15 November 2024).).

3.2.1. Fixed Remuneration

As detailed in the previous section, the Fixed Remuneration of Executive Directors is established on a calendar year basis.

In the financial year 2024-2025 the Fixed Remunerations were as follows:

	Year 2024	% increase	Year 2025 ¹	Financial year 2024-2025 ²
Chief Executive Officer	€ 882,904	2%	€ 900,562	€ 891,225
Secretary Director	€ 258,812	-	N/A	€ 57,123

1. These amounts were fixed at the Board of Directors' meeting of 5 November 2024 on proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, presented in the IARC for the

financial year 2023-2024 and approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders in 2025.

- Given that the Company's fiscal year is different from the calendar year, in calculating the accrual of this remuneration, three monthly payments for the year 2024 plus nine monthly payments for 2025 with their corresponding proportional accruals of extraordinary payments are used. Therefore, the amount accrued as Fixed Salary in fiscal year 2024/2025 amounts to € 891,225 euros in the case of the Chief Executive Officer and In the case of the Secretary-Director, she received the fixed remuneration corresponding to one and a half months (from 1 October to 15 November 2024), with the corresponding proportional accruals of extraordinary payments.
- The increase agreed for the Chief Executive Officer (2%) has been determined at a lower percentage than that applied to the rest of the staff with non-statutory review, which has been 3,1%.

3.2.2. Short-Term Variable Remuneration

As established in the 2025-2027 Remuneration Policy, the Short-Term Variable Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer is based on 150% of the Fixed Remuneration, which is multiplied by the degree of achievement of objectives in the year, with a maximum degree of achievement of up to 115%.

In accordance with these parameters, the Appointments and Remuneration Committee at its meeting of 5 November 2025, and with the determined results of the financial year, established the following degree of achievement which was ratified by the Board of Directors at the meeting of the same day:

Chief Executive Officer - Target Incentive: 1,350,843 euros (150% of Fixed Remuneration)					
Target	Weighting	Target	% Achievement	% Payment	Amount to be paid
EBIT adjusted	60%	411	92%	0%	0
Working Capital	15%	-2.910	>120%	120%	243.151
Personal contribution	25%	--	85%	85%	287,054
Total	100%	--	--	39.3%	530,206
Targets in thousand euros					

Regarding the calculation of the adjusted EBIT target, the Inventory Profit effect and new acquisitions are not taken into account.

Regarding the personal contribution, which includes qualitative objectives and sustainability objectives, the details of achievement were as follows:

Chief Executive Officer		
Qualitative personal objectives (Weight: 15%)		
Evaluation: 75%		
1. Strategic planning: focus on organic and inorganic growth, 2. Integration of new businesses: special focus on synergies with existing businesses, reporting, operations and culture. 3. Continue to develop relations with external stakeholders and strengthen relations with the most relevant stakeholders. 4. Cultural evolution to a performance-focused model. Focus on leadership capabilities and the overall transformation of the company's culture. Continue the process of organisational structure.		
Sustainability Objectives (Weight: 10%)		
Evaluation: 100%		
Target	Results	Achievement
- Reduction of accidents. Reduction of the "Lost time accidents" indicator	2.19	Yes
- Talent Density" indicator in LVC (Top 600)	57%	Yes
- Pay gap reduction	-0.15 p.p	Yes
- Hiring of women in leadership and management positions	51%	Yes
- Promotions in the collective "Youners".	70%	Yes
- Environment, emissions reduction by increasing the number of low-emission kilometres	87%	Yes

In the case of the Secretary Director, at the time of termination, the amount of Short-Term Variable Remuneration was calculated considering the following factors (i) pro-rata based on the time the Secretary Director maintained her relationship with the Company (12.5% of the financial year); and (ii) the Company's results up to the date of termination. In view of the above, the payment of 14,795 euros in Short-Term Variable Remuneration was approved.

3.2.3. Long-Term Variable Remuneration

During the 2024-2025 financial year, the second cycle of the 2021-2023 Long-Term Incentive Plan, which was launched in October 2022 and vested on 30 September 2025, vested during the 2024-2025 financial year.

The Appointments and Remuneration Committee at its meeting on 5 november 2025, and with the results determined for the financial year, established the following level of achievement, which was ratified by the Board of Directors at its meeting on the same day:

Target	Weighting	Target	Achieved	% Payment
Adjusted EBIT	65%	1.169	96,6%	82,5%
Comparative profitability	25%	n/a	45,4%	0%
Km travelled low emission fleet	5%	82%	100%	100%
Maintenance CDP list	5%	A-A-A	100%	100%
Total	100%	--	--	63,6%

Chief Executive Officer	Secretary Director
Target shares: 95,566	Target shares: 7,976
Payment: 63,6%	Payment: 63,6%
	Prorate : 71%*
Consolidated actions: 60,780	Consolidated actions: 8,161
Equivalent amount: 1,756,542	Equivalent amount: 103,779

* This is the result of dividing the time elapsed between the date of the beginning of the cycle and the date of the termination of the Secretary Director by the total duration of the period for measuring objectives (3 years.).

With regard to the calculation of the adjusted EBIT target, the Inventory Profit effect and new acquisitions are not taken into account.

As for the Comparative Shareholder Return criterion, determined by the comparative position in terms of the Total Shareholder Return Calculation in its Comparator Group, the minimum achievement threshold has not been reached, with Logista at the 45.4 percentile, as follows:

Peers	TSR	
XPO	106,63	215,5%
JTI	3.004,33	126,6%
IBEX TOP DIVIDENDO	7.998,00	111,4%
MCKESSON CORP	361,21	101,6%
PMI	85,66	91,5%
IMB	1.692,39	88,9%
LOGISTA	14,90	77,2%
ID LOGISTICS	172,47	66,4%
STEF	54,06	64,6%
IBEX MEDIUM CAP	6.453,34	51,8%
BAT	1.320,14	38,5%
DHL	4,79	14,0%

In terms of sustainability objectives, with a weighting of 5% each:

- With regard to the reduction of emissions with the Logista fleet, a target was set for an increase of 8 percentage points in the percentage of sustainable kilometres travelled with the Logista fleet over the three years of the Plan, based on the previous year (74% of kilometres travelled with the sustainable fleet), with the target therefore being to achieve 82% of the total kilometres travelled with the sustainable fleet. The percentage achieved was 82%, which represents a 100% achievement rate.
- Logista has also obtained the rating, A, on the CDP List for the three years of the cycle, which represents 100% achievement.

The transfer of the consolidated shares shall be free of charge and shall be subject to the retention and redemption clauses set out in paragraph 2 above.

In addition, the 2024-2025 financial year saw the launch of the first vesting period of the 2024-2026 Long-Term Incentive Plan, launched in October 2024 and vesting in September 2027, as set out in the 2023-2024 ARR.

3.2.4. Long-term savings schemes

Contributions to pension plans have been made in accordance with the Policy, and the pension schemes contemplated in the Policy are set out in detail in section 2. Based thereon the contributions accrued by the Directors in this financial year are € 344,205 in the case of the Chief Executive Officer, and €4,444 in the case of the Company Secretary.

On the other hand, in relation to the Secretary Director, the Company recovered the funds accumulated in the Executive Severance Plan, known as Plan 60, as the conditions required for the Secretary Director to consolidate this amount were not met.

3.2.5. Remuneration in kind

The Company has taken out and pays the global premium corresponding to a Directors' and executives' civil liability insurance policy covering all Directors, both executive and non-executive. In this policy, the Directors are considered insured for the liabilities that may be demanded of them because of the performance of the activities inherent to their duties.

In particular, both the contract of the Chief Executive Officer and that of the Company Secretary require the Company to take out a civil liability insurance policy. As the civil liability insurance is taken out on a global basis, it is not possible to calculate the part of the insurance attributable to the Directors as remuneration in kind, but in any case, its individual amount is not significant.

In addition, executive directors are beneficiaries of a life insurance policy with an annual premium of € 5,610. This package also includes medical insurance and company car insurance, amounting to the following amounts:

Remuneration in kind:	
Chief Executive Officer	€ 32,642
Secretary Director	€ 3,894

In the case of the Director-Secretary, this amount is prorated according to the length of her relationship with the Company.

3.3. Remuneration of Directors in their capacity as such in the financial year 2023-2024

As described in section 2.5, the remuneration of the Directors in their capacity as such consists of a fixed monthly allowance and per diems for attendance at the relevant meetings.

The amounts of these items, in the financial year 2024-2025, were presented in last year's ARR:

Fixed monthly cash allowance:	
President of the Board	30.600€
Director	5.100€
Chairman of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee	1.700€
Chairman of the Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee	1.700€

Per diem allowances for attendance at meetings (per meeting):	
Board of Directors	2.805€
Appointments and Remuneration Committee	1.020€
Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee	1.632€

The proprietary directors have waived the right to receive any remuneration as directors of the Company.

Therefore, the Fixed Remuneration during the financial year 2024-2025 amounted to 858,000 euros and the remuneration accrued as per diems amounted to 258,000 euros, in accordance with the holding of 10 meetings of the Board, 6 of the Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee and 8 of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee.

Therefore, the total remuneration of the Board for the exercise of non-executive functions remained below the maximum limit for such remuneration set in the Remuneration Policy of 1,600,000 euros.

4. Bodies involved in the process of determining, approving and implementing the Remuneration Policy

4.1. The Appointments and Remuneration Committee

The Appointments and Remuneration Committee (the "ARC") of Logista Integral, S.A. ("Logista" or the "Company") is governed by Article 529 quincecies of the Spanish Companies Act, Article 18 of the Company's Bylaws, Articles 14 and 17 of the Board of Directors' Regulations, and by its own Regulations, which are aligned with the recommendations of the Technical Guide on Appointments and Remuneration Committees, as approved by the CNMV on 20 February 2019.

As part of its responsibilities, the ARC proposes and oversees the remuneration policy for directors and senior executives, ensuring transparency and alignment with the Company's strategy. To this end, the ARC meets regularly and at least four times a year, convened by its Chair or at the request of two of its members.

The ARC ensures that the individual remuneration of directors aligns with best market and corporate governance practices and takes into account the overall remuneration and working conditions of Logista employees. For this purpose, it also considers comparative data from other companies.

In carrying out its duties, the ARC may access any information or documentation held by the Company in an appropriate, timely, and sufficient manner, and may also seek the assistance or advice of external professionals when deemed necessary or appropriate for the proper performance of its functions.

1.2. The Board of Directors

At the proposal of the ARC, the Board of Directors approves and oversees the implementation of the Remuneration Policy for directors and senior executives, including long-term incentives linked to the share value, prior to its submission to the General Shareholders' Meeting. The Board of Directors also approves, following a report from the ARC, the individual remuneration and other contractual conditions of the Company's executive directors.

1.3. The Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee

Logista's Audit, Control and Sustainability Committee participates in the decision-making process in relation to the variable remuneration of the executive directors by supervising the economic and financial information that serves as the basis for calculating the level of compliance with the objectives set for the purpose of receiving such remuneration.

1.4. The General Meeting of Shareholders

The approval of the Remuneration Policy falls under the responsibility of the General Shareholders' Meeting, which also issues an advisory vote on the Annual Directors' Remuneration Report. This report details, among other items, the remuneration accrued during the previous financial year.

5. Work carried out by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, in the area of directors' remuneration.

During the current fiscal year, the ARC proposed to the Board of Directors the new Directors' Remuneration Policy for the 2025–2027 period. This policy included specific adjustments to reflect the new structure of the Board, as well as an update of the remuneration amounts for directors in their capacity as such. The Policy was approved at the General Shareholders' Meeting held in February 2025.

Additionally, in the 2024 financial year, the ARC carried out the following actions regarding remuneration:

- Proposal to the Board of Directors of the Annual Directors' Remuneration Report.
- Evaluation of the level of achievement of the Group's short- and long-term business objectives (Bonus) and proposal for setting the short- and long-term objectives for the following year.
- Ongoing monitoring, throughout the year, of the achievement of those objectives.
- Evaluation of the short-term variable remuneration of the executive director.

- Determination of the fixed remuneration of the executive director.
- Senior Management compensation review.

6. Alignment of the Remuneration Policy and its implementation with the Company's strategy, interests, long-term sustainability and risk mitigation.

6.1. Specific principles contained in the Policy

The Directors' Remuneration Policy, as regards their executive functions, includes the following specific principles:

- Linkage to business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability: Contribute to the business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability of the Company by creating shareholder value in a sustainable manner over time.
- Linking remuneration to results ("pay for performance"): Establishing a direct link with the achievement of strategic objectives (financial and non-financial), concrete, quantifiable and aligned with the Business Plan, which focus on the creation of sustainable value. Establishing a balanced remuneration mix, with a significant weight of performance-linked remuneration, particularly in the long term.
- Risk control: Variable remuneration is not guaranteed, so that it is possible not to pay this component if certain targets are not achieved, and it is subject to certain adjustment mechanisms (malus and clawback clauses) that allow it to be sufficiently flexible. The weighting of fixed and variable elements in the remuneration mix allows for adequate risk management.

6.2. Reducing exposure to risk

The reduction in risk exposure has been structured around the following factors:

- Variable remuneration has been established with minimum compliance criteria, so that, under this premise, it is possible that executive directors may not receive any amount for this item if these thresholds are not reached.
- The Board of Directors determines the degree of compliance with the operating objectives after the Company's annual accounts have been audited, which allows it to take into account, where appropriate, any qualifications that may be made to reduce the amount of variable remuneration. Likewise, the sustainability objectives have been linked to compliance with certain environmental sustainability objectives (reduction of quantified CO2 emissions, inclusion or maintenance of presence in environmental sustainability indices).
- The establishment of a 3-year time horizon for Executive Directors as part of their variable

remuneration scheme is specifically designed to ensure that the evaluation process considers long-term performance taking into account the underlying business cycle of the Group.

- The shares to which the executive directors are entitled under these plans only vest 3 years after the launch of the relevant cycle and after the Board has determined the extent to which the objectives for each period have been met.
- The obligation to hold shares: as an element to minimise exposure to the risk of Long-Term Variable Remuneration, the obligation of the Executive Directors to hold a package of shares of those delivered in application of the long-term incentives equivalent to 2 annuities of annual Fixed Remuneration for the duration of the contractual relationship between the Executive Directors and the Company is foreseen.
- The contracts of Executive Directors have "malus" clauses to cancel the payment of variable remuneration in both the short and long term, as well as "clawback" clauses on the terms explained above.
- The Board of Directors and the Appointments and Remuneration Committee have followed a formal and transparent procedure both for proposing the design of the Remuneration Policy and for establishing the remuneration packages of the Directors following the regulations and principles set out therein.
- The remuneration policy approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders was therefore rigorously applied during the year. There have been no deviations in the procedure for the application of this policy and the maximum limits established therein have not been exceeded.
- No executive director has been involved in decisions regarding his own remuneration.
- As regards remuneration for the exercise of non-executive functions, the establishment of fixed remuneration and Per diem allowances, without including any variable or over-incentivised items for all Directors, is considered an effective instrument to reduce exposure to excessive risks.
- With regard to the exercise of executive functions, as explained in section 2, the measures taken to eliminate excessive risk-taking are linked:
 - The specific business objectives set, which were only assessed after the annual accounts had been audited and formulated.
 - The existence of malus and clawback clauses for all variable remuneration.
 - The establishment of a long-term remuneration plan, which includes both operational economic objectives and objectives for the creation of shareholder value and sustainability with a long-term time horizon, adjusted to the economic cycles of the Company. This is complemented by the

obligation of the Executive Directors to hold a number of shares of those delivered under the various remuneration plans equivalent to two years of their annual Fixed Remuneration.

7. [Statistical Annex to the Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration of public limited companies to CNMV Circular 4/2013.](#)

ITEMISED INDIVIDUAL REMUNERATION ACCRUED BY EACH DIRECTOR

Name	Type	Period of accrual in year 2025
Luis Isasi Fernández de Bobadilla	Chairman-Independent	01/10/2024 a 30/09/2025
Cristina Garmendia Mendizábal	Independent Vice Chairman	01/10/2024 a 30/09/2025
Íñigo Meirás Amusco	CEO	01/10/2024 a 30/09/2025
Manuel González Cid	Director - Independent	01/10/2024 a 30/09/2025
Teresa Paz-Ares	Director - Independent	01/10/2024 a 30/09/2025
Pilar Platero Sanz	Director - Independent	01/10/2024 a 30/09/2025
Cristina Ruiz Ortega	Director - Independent	15/11/2024 a 30/09/2025
María Echenique Moscoso del Prado	Secretary Director - Executive	01/10/2024 a 15/11/2024
Richard Hathaway	Director - Proprietary	01/10/2024 a 30/06/2025
Julia Lefèvre	Director - Proprietary	01/10/2024 a 30/09/2025
Celso Marciniuk	Director - Proprietary	01/10/2024 a 30/09/2025
Kevin Massie	Director- Proprietary	01/09/2025 a 30/09/2025
Murray McGowan	Director- Proprietary	01/10/2024 a 31/08/2025
Jennifer Ramsey	Director- Proprietary	01/10/2024 a 30/09/2025
Martin Staunton	Director- Proprietary	16/07/2025 a 30/09/2025

C.1 Complete the following tables regarding the individual remuneration of each Director (including remuneration received for performing executive duties) accrued during the year.

a) Remuneration from the reporting company:

i) Remuneration accruing in cash (thousands of euros)

Name	Fixed Remuneration	Per diem allowance	Remuneration for memberships of the board committees	Salary	Shor-term variable remuneration	Long-term variable remuneration	Indemnification	Other Items	Total year 2025	Total year 2024
Luis Isasi Fernández de Bobadilla	431	37							468	344
Cristina Garmendia Mendizábal	64	39							103	96
Íñigo Meirás Amusco	64	29							93	86
Manuel González Cid	64	36							100	63
Teresa Paz-Ares	69	37	15						121	89
Pilar Platero Sanz	69	47	16						132	121
Cristina Ruiz Ortega	56	30							86	0
María Echenique Moscoso del Prado	11	3							14	86
Richard Hathaway										
Julia Lefèvre										
Celso Marciniuk										
Kevin Massie										
Murray McGowan										
Jennifer Ramsey										

Martin Staunton										
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ii) Table of changes in share-based remuneration schemes and gross profit from vested shares or financial instruments

Name	Name of Plan	Financial Instruments at start of the year		Financial Instruments grating during the year		Financial Instruments vested during the year				Instruments matured but not exercised	Financial Instruments at end of the year	
		No. of instruments	No. of Equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent/vested shares	Price of Vested shares	Gross profit from vested shares or financial instruments (thousands of euros)	No. of instruments	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares
IÑIGO MEIRAS	2nd Consolidation Period Plan 2021-2023	95.566	95.566				60.780	28,9	1.757			
	3rd Consolidation Period Plan 2021-2023	82.436	82.436								82.436	82.436
	1st Consolidation Period Plan 2024-2027			72.448	72.448						72.448	72.448
María Echenique	2nd Consolidation Period Plan 2021-2023	7.976	7.976				3.591	28,9	104		7.976	7.976
	3 rd	2.580	2.580									

	Consolidation Period Plan 2021- 2023											
	1st Consolidation Period Plan 2024- 2027			252	252							

Remarks

iii) Long-term savings schemes

Name	Contribution for the year by the company (thousands of euros)				Amount of accrued funds			
	Savings schemes with vested economic rights		Savings schemes with non-vested economic rights		(thousands of euros)			
	Year 2025	Year 2024	Year 2025	Year 2024	Year 2025		Year 2024	
					Schemes with vested economic rights	Schemes with non-vested economic rights	Schemes with vested economic rights	Schemes with non-vested economic rights

iv) Details of other items

Name	Item	Amount of remuneration

b) Remuneration of the listed company’s directors for seats on governing bodies of its subsidiaries

i) Remuneration accruing in cash (thousands of euros)

Name	Fixed Remuneration	Per diem allowances	Remuneration on for memberships of board committees	Salary	Short Term Variable Remuneration	Long Term Variable Remuneration	Compensation	Other Items	Total year 2025	Total Year 2024
ÍÑIGO MEIRÁS				891	530				1.421	2192
MARIA ECHENIQUE				57	15		468		540	371

Remarks
This table includes the remuneration received in the exercise of executive functions, which is paid through Compañía de Distribución Integral Logista, S.A.U., 100% subsidiary of the Company. The Secretary Director left the company on 15 November 2025 and her departure indemnity under the terms agreed in her contract is 374 thousand euros, corresponding to one year's fixed salary plus a variable short term target, plus 93 thousand euros for lack of notice.

ii) **Table of changes in share-based remuneration schemes and gross profit from vested shares or financial instruments**

Name	Name of plan	Financial instruments at start of year n		Financial instruments granted during year n		Financial instruments vested during the year				Instruments matured but not exercised	Financial instruments at end of year n	
		No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent / vested shares	Price of vested shares	Gross profit from vested shares or financial instruments (thousands of euros)	No. of instruments	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares

Remarks

iii) **Long-term savings schemes**

Director	Remuneration for the vested rights of savings schemes
Íñigo Meirás	344
María Echenique	4

Name	Contribution for the year by the company (thousands of euros)				Amount of accrued funds (thousands of euros)			
	Savings schemes with vested economic rights		Savings schemes with non- vested economic rights		Savings schemes with vested economic rights			
	Year 2025	Year 2024	Year 2025	Year 2024	Year 2025		Year 2024	
					Schemes with vested economic rights	Schemes with non-vested economic rights	Schemes with vested economic rights	Schemes with non- vested economic rights
Iñigo Meirás	344	413			1.398		1.086	
María Echenique	4	42			268	291	264	291

Remarks
The amounts accrued in the systems with vested economic rights correspond to the actual figure stated in the corresponding insurance policy, which include the investment gain as well as the corresponding tax deduction.
The amounts of the non-vested savings schemes correspond to the contributions to the management buy-out plan (Plan 60).

iv) Details of other items

Name	Item	Amount of remuneration
Iñigo Meirás	Social Welfare Systems	33
María Echenique	Social Welfare Systems	4

Remarks
This amount is the value of the benefits package similar to that of the rest of the senior management. This includes company car, fuel, meals and medical insurance among others.

C) Summary of remuneration (thousands of euros):

This summary must include the amounts corresponding to all the remuneration items included in this report that have accrued to each Director, in thousands of euros.

Name	Remuneration accruing in the Company					Remuneration accruing in group companies					Total year 2025
	Total cash remuneration	Gross profit from vested shares or financial instruments	Remuneration from savings schemes	Other items of remuneration	Total in year 2025 company	Total cash remuneration	Gross profit from vested shares or financial instruments	Remuneration from savings schemes	Other items of remuneration	Total in year 2025 group	
Luis Isasi Fernández de Bobadilla	468				468					0	468
Cristina Garmendia Mendizábal	103				103					0	103
Íñigo Meirás Amusco	93	1.757			1.850	1.421		344	33	1.798	3.648
Manuel González Cid	100				100					0	100
Teresa Paz-Ares	121				121					0	121
Pilar Platero Sanz	132				132					0	132
Cristina Ruiz Ortega	86				86					0	86
María Echenique Moscoso del Prado	14	104			118	540		4	4	548	666
Richard Hathaway											
Julia Lefèvre											
Celso Marciniuk											
Kevin Massie											
Murray McGowan											
Jennifer Ramsey											

Martin Staunton											
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C.2. Indicate the evolution over the last 5 years of the amount and percentage variation of the remuneration accrued by each of the listed company's directors who have been directors during the financial year, of the consolidated results of the company and of the average remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis of the employees of the company and its subsidiaries who are not directors of the listed company.

	<u>Total amounts accrued and % annual variation</u>								
	Year 2025	% variation 2025/2024	Year 2024	% variation 2024/2023	Year 2023	% variation 2023/2022	Year 2022	% variation 2022/2021	Year 2021
Executive Directors	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Íñigo Meirás	3.648	-32	5.397	-3	5.577	61	3.445	45	2.375
María Echenique	666	-12	756	0,4	753	20	625	42	440
External Directors									
Luis Isasi	468	36	344	282	90	-5	95	8	88
Cristina Garmendia	103	7	96	3	93	-2	95	0	95
Manuel González	100	58	63	-	0	-	0	-	0
Teresa Paz-Ares	121	37	89	-	0	-	0	-	0
Pilar Platero	132	9	121	30	93	-2	95	0	95
Cristina Ruiz	86								

Consolidated results of the Company	382		419	13,24	370	29,37	286	9,58	261
Average remuneration of employees	39	-	39	-2,50	40	0,00	40	-8,11	37

Remarks
A In order to facilitate the uniformity and comparability of the data, and to adequately explain the variations in the remuneration of the directors in the last financial year, the following observations are made: D. Iñigo Meirás: - The negative variation between 2024 and 2025 is due to the lower percentage of payment in both the Short-Term Variable Remuneration and the Long-Term Incentive Plan. Ms. María Echenique: - The Director Secretary ceased to hold office with the Company on 15 November 2024. For this reason, remuneration for a full year is not included in fiscal year 2025, although it includes her exit compensation. D. Luis Isasi: - During fiscal year 24 Mr. Isasi was appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors, so his remuneration is updated in line with the position. The difference between financial year 2025 and 2024 is due to the fact that the specific remuneration for the chairmanship of the Board accrued in full in 2025, whereas in 2024 it accrued as of his appointment on 2 February 2024. Ms. Teresa Paz joined the Board of Logista in the year 24 and therefore their remuneration in that year was pro rata. In addition, she was appointed as Chairman of the NRC in May 2024. D. Manuel González joined the Board of Logista in the year 24 and therefore their remuneration in that year was pro rata. The amounts relating to average employee remuneration exclude social security costs in accordance with the instructions of the CNMV.

